HR That Works Blog

On April 25, 2012, the EEOC issued updated Enforcement Guidance regarding an employer’s use of arrest and conviction records in making employment decisions. The agency also issued a Question and Answer (Q&A) document that helps explain the Guidance.

According to the EEOC, a policy or practice that excludes everyone with a criminal record from employment will not be job related and consistent with business necessity and therefore will violate Title VII, unless it is required by federal law. The Enforcement Guidance explains how the EEOC analyzes the “job related and consistent with business necessity” standard for adverse employment hiring decisions based on criminal records, and provides hypothetical examples interpreting the standard.

Arrests and convictions are treated differently for purposes of Title VII, since the fact of an arrest does not establish that criminal conduct has occurred. The EEOC acknowledges that an arrest may in some circumstances trigger an inquiry into whether the conduct underlying the arrest justifies an adverse employment action. The Guidance notes, “[a]lthough an arrest standing alone may not be used to deny an employment opportunity, an employer may make an employment decision based on the conduct underlying the arrest if the conduct makes the individual unfit for the position in question. The conduct, not the arrest, is relevant for employment purposes.”

In examining whether an employer’s policy of screening individuals based on criminal convictions violates Title VII, the EEOC will look to see whether the employer’s policy provides an opportunity for an individualized assessment for those people identified by the screen in order to determine if the policy as applied is job related and consistent with business necessity. Under the new enforcement rules, the following should be considered by an employer when screening based on criminal convictions:

• The Nature and Gravity of the Offense or Conduct. The Guidance notes: “Careful consideration of the nature and gravity of the offense or conduct is the first step in determining whether a specific crime may be relevant to concerns about risks in a particular position. The nature of the offense or conduct may be assessed with reference to the harm caused by the crime (e.g., theft causes property loss). … With respect to the gravity of the crime, offenses identified as misdemeanors may be less severe than those identified as felonies.”

• The Time that Has Passed Since the Offense, Conduct and/or Completion of the Sentence. The Guidance points out that the amount of time that had passed since the applicant’s criminal conduct occurred is probative of the risk he poses in the position in question. For example, the Guidance notes that the risk of recidivism may decline over a certain period of time.

• The Nature of the Job Held or Sought. Linking the criminal conduct to the essential functions of the position in question may assist an employer in demonstrating that its policy or practice is job related and consistent with business necessity because it “bear[s] a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used.”

The Guidance also lists examples of employer best practices for considering criminal records in connection with employment decisions. Among other examples, the Guidance advises employers to (1) develop a narrowly tailored written policy and procedure for screening applicants and employees for criminal conduct, (2) identify essential job requirements and the actual circumstances under which the jobs are performed, (3) determine the specific offenses that may demonstrate unfitness for performing such jobs, (4) determine the duration of exclusions for criminal conduct based on all available evidence, and (5) record the justification for the policy and procedures.

Article courtesy of Worklaw® Network firm Shawe Rosenthal (www.shawe.com).

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission recently issued an opinion concluding that under Title VII, employees may bring discrimination claims based on their transgendered status or gender identity.

Mia Macy was a male police detective in Phoenix, Arizona.  In 2010, Macy decided to relocate to San Francisco and pursue a position with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.  After the interview process, a local director for the Bureau informed Macy that she would be able to fill the position provided that she passed a background check.  While her background check was pending, Macy informed the third-party contractor responsible for filling the position that she was in the process of transitioning from male to female.  The contractor relayed this information to the Bureau.  Five days later, the Bureau notified Macy that the position had been cut due to budget restrictions.  An EEO counselor at the Bureau, however, told Macy that another applicant had been hired for the position because that individual was farther along in the background investigation process.  Macy filed a discrimination charge against the Bureau, alleging sex discrimination, and discrimination on the basis of gender identity (as a transgender woman) and sex stereotyping.  When only her sex discrimination claim was accepted, however, Macy appealed.

The Commission reversed the decision, concluding that discrimination claims based on transgender status or gender identity are covered under Title VII.  The Commission based its conclusion principally upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) and subsequent decisions by federal courts.  In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held that discrimination on the basis of gender stereotype (e.g., a woman denied partnership in a company because she was too “macho” and not “feminine” enough) is sex-based discrimination prohibited under Title VII.  Several United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have subsequently held that under this holding, Title VII bars “not just discrimination because of biological sex, but also gender stereotyping—failing to act and appear according to expectations defined by gender.”  Following this approach, the Commission reasoned that when an employer discriminates against someone because the person is transgender, the disparate treatment is “related to the sex of the victim.”  According to the Commission, this includes a person allegedly discriminated against for expressing his or her gender in a non-stereotypical fashion, and a person allegedly discriminated against because an employer is uncomfortable with or dislikes the fact that he or she has or is transitioning from one gender to another.

Going forward, employers should assume that the Commission’s opinion is legally correct.  While the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed whether transgender or gender identity discrimination claims are covered under Title VII, many lower courts have held that this is a protected class.  Therefore, given the current trend in federal courts to recognize the validity of such claims, the Commission’s opinion will certainly bolster an employee’s ability to bring gender identity and transgender discrimination claims under Title VII.

Article written by Josh Meeuwse and provided courtesy of Worklaw Network firm Franczek Radelet (www.franczek.com)>

In 2009 the US Supreme Court pretty much cut out “mixed-motive” cases in the age arena. Meaning you now have to show that “but for” age discrimination you would have suffered that loss of job, etc. If there is any legit reason for your termination then you lose. In response to this ruling the legislatures are busy trying to work their way around it and the EEOC has updated its regulations as follows (underlining mine):

§ 1625.7   Differentiations based on reasonable factors other than age (RFOA).

(b) When an employment practice uses age as a limiting criterion, the defense that the practice is justified by a reasonable factor other than age is unavailable.

(c) Any employment practice that adversely affects individuals within the protected age group on the basis of older age is discriminatory unless the practice is justified by a “reasonable factor other than age.” An individual challenging the allegedly unlawful practice is responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practice that allegedly causes any observed statistical disparities.

(d) Whenever the “reasonable factors other than age” defense is raised, the employer bears the burdens of production and persuasion to demonstrate the defense. The “reasonable factors other than age” provision is not available as a defense to a claim of disparate treatment. (Meaning individual harassment, discrimination, etc.)

(e)     (1) A reasonable factor other than age is a non-age factor that is objectively reasonable when viewed from the position of a prudent employer mindful of its responsibilities under the ADEA under like circumstances. Whether a differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age must be decided on the basis of all the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each individual situation. To establish the RFOA defense, an employer must show that the employment practice was both reasonably designed to further or achieve a legitimate business purpose and administered in a way that reasonably achieves that purpose in light of the particular facts and circumstances that were known, or should have been known, to the employer.

(2) Considerations that are relevant to whether a practice is based on a reasonable factor other than age include, but are not limited to:

(i) The extent to which the factor is related to the employer’s stated business purpose;

(ii) The extent to which the employer defined the factor accurately and applied the factor fairly and accurately, including the extent to which managers and supervisors were given guidance or training about how to apply the factor and avoid discrimination;

(iii) The extent to which the employer limited supervisors’ discretion to assess employees subjectively, particularly where the criteria that the supervisors were asked to evaluate are known to be subject to negative age-based stereotypes;

(iv) The extent to which the employer assessed the adverse impact of its employment practice on older workers; and

(v) The degree of the harm to individuals within the protected age group, in terms of both the extent of injury and the numbers of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the employer took steps to reduce the harm, in light of the burden of undertaking such steps.

(3) No specific consideration or combination of considerations need be present for a differentiation to be based on reasonable factors other than age. Nor does the presence of one of these considerations automatically establish the defense.

Word to the wise: Make sure you can fit any promotion, termination, or layoff type decision into the guidelines set forth above.

Today, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) released the first updates in nearly 25 years to its guidelines on when and how employers may inquire into an applicant’s arrest and conviction history.  According to the EEOC, the new Guidance clarifies and updates the EEOC’s longstanding policy concerning the use of arrest and conviction records in employment, which will assist job seekers, employees, employers, and many other agency stakeholders.  Our preliminary analysis confirms that the Guidelines do not appear to represent a fundamental shift in the EEOC’s positions, but rather summarize pre-existing guidelines and principles based on applicable case law and available demographic research.

The EEOC’s Updated Guidance

No federal law explicitly prohibits employers from so inquiring into an applicant’s past criminal history, however, court decisions and EEOC guidelines have previously recognized that, in some cases, disqualifying an applicant because of an arrest or conviction record could violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (Title VII), which prohibits employment discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex and national origin.  The updated Guidance notes that the use of criminal history may violate Title VII in one of two ways.  First, Title VII may be violated when an employer treats criminal history information differently for different applicants or employees, based on their race or national origin (i.e., disparate treatment liability).  Second, a violation may occur where an employer’s facially neutral policy of excluding applicants from employment based on criminal history disproportionately impacts African American and/or Hispanic applicants and is not job related and consistent with business necessity (i.e., disparate impact liability).

The Guidance distinguishes between the use of arrest and conviction records. According to the EEOC, an employer’s reliance on an arrest record in and of itself is not job related and consistent with business necessity because the fact of an arrest does not establish that criminal conduct has occurred.  However, an employer may make an employment decision based on the conduct underlying an arrest if that conduct makes the individual unfit for the position in question.  The EEOC further recognizes that a conviction record in most cases will usually serve as sufficient evidence that an individual engaged in particular conduct, but notes that in certain circumstances there may be reasons why an employer should not rely on a conviction record alone.

The Guidance cites to nationwide statistical data showing that African American and Hispanic individuals are arrested and convicted at a rate 2 to 3 times their proportion of the general population and states that this nationwide data provides a basis for EEOC to investigate an employer’s use of criminal records.  During an investigation, the EEOC will look to whether the particular employer’s use of criminal history has a statistically significant disparate impact on any protected group.

Once a disproportionate impact is shown, the employer may only avoid liability if it can show that the reliance on criminal history is job related and consistent with business necessity.  The revised Guidance sets out two circumstances in which the EEOC believes employers will consistently meet this defense:

1. The employer validates the criminal conduct exclusion for the position in question under the EEOC Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures; or

2. The employer develops a targeted screen that considers at least the nature of the crime, the time elapsed, and the nature of the job.  The employer’s policy must also provide an opportunity for an individualized assessment of those people identified by the screen to determine if the policy as applied is job related and consistent with business necessity.

As to the first defense, the Guidance recognizes that in most cases this will not be a viable option because of the lack of currently available studies that could provide a framework for formal validation.  For the second defense, the Guidance notes that while an “individualized assessment” is not required under Title VII under all circumstances, the lack of an individualized assessment is more likely to result in a violation.

Best Practices Identified by the EEOC

The Guidance provides several examples of best practices for employers who consider criminal record information when making employment decisions (beyond a recommendation for more training).  In general, the EEOC advises employers to eliminate policies or practices that “exclude people from employment based on any criminal record” and to replace them with “narrowly tailored” policies that provide for targeted, individualized screening of specific offenses based on a job’s essential requirements and actual duties.  The Commission also recommends that employers keep a record of the justifications and research that supports those policies.  Finally, the EEOC suggests that when asking questions about criminal records employers should limit their inquiries to records for which an exclusion would be job related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.

Conclusion

Background checks remain fraught with potential pitfalls for employers.  However, employers should not let those hazards stop them from performing proper due diligence on potential employees, provided that they do so in a targeted and individualized manner that relies only on criminal history in a manner that is consistent with the EEOC Guidance.  We will be providing clients with more detailed guidance and training opportunities in the coming weeks on this important update of the EEOC’s views on the use of criminal history records in hiring.

Article written by attorneys Doug Hass and Mike Warner and provided courtesy of Worklaw® Network firm Franczek Radelet.

In the recent case of Mustafa Rehmani v. Ericsson, Inc., the court introduced the facts as follows:

“Petitioner Rehmani, a Muslim born in Pakistan, worked as a System Test Engineer for Ericsson from February 2007, when Ericsson acquired Rehmani’s prior employer, to November 13, 2009, the day he was terminated. During his tenure at Ericsson he had coworkers from at least 12 different countries, including India, China, and Pakistan. Three of those coworkers — Amit Patel, Aneel Choppa, and Ashit Ghevaria — originally were, along with Ericsson, the objects of the underlying lawsuit in this case.” As the case then explains Rehmani claimed the Indian dudes pretty much treated the Pakistanis, Chinese and other non-Indians as second class citizens. From there the facts are like any other “traditional” discrimination case. I recently reported on a case filed the EEOC against an oil refinery because they hired Hispanics over both African Americans and Whites.

Here’s my point: Discrimination is no longer by the black and white thing. It’s growing as a nationality thing. Many immigrants have different cultural views related to the subject and may have long standing rivalries brought to our shores. The solution: Know your legal obligations, be clear about what you won’t tolerate and realize all of us could use a bit of training!

The EEOC is proud of its lawsuits. I used to be proud of mine too…until I realized thy cause more damage than good…even where there was bad conduct. According to the EEOC’s press release page these are the claims from just one week:

EEOC Sues Owner of Golden LivingCenter – Dartmouth for Disability Discrimination 3/19/12

Agricultural Supplier Olam Settles EEOC Pregnancy Discrimination Suit for $140,000 in Fresno 3/15/12

Warren Tricomi to Pay $30,000 to Settle EEOC Pregnancy Discrimination Suit 3/15/12

Hal Leonard to Pay $150,000 to Settle EEOC Sexual Harassment Charge 3/14/12

Family Video to Pay $70,000 to Settle EEOC Disability Discrimination Suit 3/14/12

Sterling and Sterling to Pay $120,000 to Settle EEOC Suit for Retaliation 3/14/12

EEOC Sues GGNSC Administrative Services For Disability Discrimination 3/13/12

Menorah House Settles EEOC Religious Discrimination Lawsuits 3/12/12

As you can see from the titles, disability and pregnancy leave have been major targets. Employers must do two things to better manage these claims: First, take disability requests and harassment complaints seriously. If you don’t know what to do, then get help. Secondly, get Employment Practices Liability Insurance. See the checklist on HR That Works. I bet every one of the companies sued that didn’t purchase it wishes it had.  Also understand this – these settlements and verdicts are LESS than they would be if brought by private attorneys in state courts.

In a case brought by a Minster/teacher against a church, the Court made it very clear that “The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful is the church’s alone.”

Here’s the Court’s summary of the case:

1. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar suits brought on behalf of ministers against their churches, claiming termination in violation of employment discrimi­nation laws. Pp. 6–15.

(a) The First Amendment provides, in part, that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Familiar with life under the established Church of England, the founding generation sought to foreclose the possibility of a national church. By forbidding the “establishment of religion” and guaranteeing the “free exercise thereof,” the Religion Clauses ensured that the new Federal Government—unlike the Eng­lish Crown—would have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices. Pp. 6–10.

 (b) This Court first considered the issue of government interfer­ence with a church’s ability to select its own ministers in the context of disputes over church property. This Court’s decisions in that area confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s determination of who can act as its ministers. See Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679; Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U. S. 94; Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U. S. 696. Pp. 10–12.

(c) Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other employment discrimination laws, the Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a “ministerial exception,” grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes application of such legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship be­tween a religious institution and its ministers. The Court agrees that there is such a ministerial exception. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such ac­tion interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.

The EEOC and Perich contend that religious organizations can de­fend against employment discrimination claims by invoking their First Amendment right to freedom of association. They thus see no need—and no basis—for a special rule for ministers grounded in the Religion Clauses themselves. Their position, however, is hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself, which gives spe­cial solicitude to the rights of religious organizations. The Court cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom to select its own ministers.

The EEOC and Perich also contend that Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872, precludes recogni­tion of a ministerial exception. But Smith involved government regu­lation of only outward physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself. Pp. 13–15.

2. Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the minis­terial exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this em­ployment discrimination suit against her religious employer. Pp. 15–21.

(a) The ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a reli­gious congregation. The Court, however, does not adopt a rigid for­mula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister. Here, it is enough to conclude that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment. Hosanna-Tabor held her out as a minister, with a role distinct from that of most of its members. That title represented a significant degree of religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning. Perich also held herself out as a minister by, for example, accepting the formal call to religious ser­vice. And her job duties reflected a role in conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission: As a source of religious in­struction, Perich played an important part in transmitting the Lu­theran faith.

In concluding that Perich was not a minister under the exception, the Sixth Circuit committed three errors. First, it failed to see any relevance in the fact that Perich was a commissioned minister. Alt­hough such a title, by itself, does not automatically ensure coverage, the fact that an employee has been ordained or commissioned as a minister is surely relevant, as is the fact that significant religious training and a recognized religious mission underlie the description of the employee’s position. Second, the Sixth Circuit gave too much weight to the fact that lay teachers at the school performed the same religious duties as Perich. Though relevant, it cannot be dispositive that others not formally recognized as ministers by the church per­form the same functions—particularly when, as here, they did so only because commissioned ministers were unavailable. Third, the Sixth Circuit placed too much emphasis on Perich’s performance of secular duties. Although the amount of time an employee spends on particu­lar activities is relevant in assessing that employee’s status, that fac­tor cannot be considered in isolation, without regard to the other con­siderations discussed above. Pp. 15–19.

(b) Because Perich was a minister for purposes of the exception, this suit must be dismissed. An order reinstating Perich as a called teacher would have plainly violated the Church’s freedom under the Religion Clauses to select its own ministers. Though Perich no longer seeks reinstatement, she continues to seek frontpay, backpay, com­pensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. An award of such relief would operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited by the First Amendment than an order overturning the termination. Such relief would depend on a determination that Hosanna-Tabor was wrong to have relieved Perich of her position, and it is precisely such a ruling that is barred by the ministerial exception.

Any suggestion that Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted religious reason for firing Perich was pretextual misses the point of the ministerial ex­ception. The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful is the church’s alone. Pp. 19–20.

(c) Today the Court holds only that the ministerial exception bars an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. The Court expresses no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits. Pp. 20–21.

597 F. 3d 769, reversed.

ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. THOM-AS, J., filed a concurring opinion. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined.

Go to http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-553.pdf to read the case.

The EEOC has just released its plan for 2012-2016. As you can imagine, stepped up investigation and litigation are part of this plan. Given their current agenda, priority will be given to those with disabilities and adverse impact racial scenarios that can be litigated on a class basis (criminal background, credit checking, layoffs, etc).

Below is an amazing DOL news release. It is the first “reverse discrimination” case I’ve seen where an employer was sued by both Black and White employees because it preferred Hispanic workers. I wonder what the management justification was? Maybe because they cost less and work harder? Why else would they be preferred? There is no claim that they were illegal. If you look at their management directory it seems “balanced” for a Texas workforce. I can tell you now that this is just the beginning of a compliance trend. Many low wage paying employers prefer the work ethic and cost of Hispanic workers. It’s a fact, Jack. Just like new immigrant cultures were preferred 1800’s manufacturing plants. And 1970’s LA sweatshops. Problem is we are addressing the symptom, not the cause. The law will never be able to create a cultural shift in work ethic or cost. Sure we can mandate tolerance but what more?  I expect unions and competing employers will push for more cases like this, especially where federal dollars are concerned.

Agreement includes $219,000 in back wages and interest for 69 African-American and Caucasian applicants plus job offers for some

HOUSTON —The U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs today announced that government contractor JacintoPort International LLC has agreed to settle allegations of hiring discrimination on the basis of race involving 48 African-American and 21 Caucasian job applicants who were rejected for longshoreman positions at the company’s cargo facility in Houston.

“In this day and age, it is shocking that any company would allow race to be a factor in determining who gets hired,” said OFCCP Director Patricia A. Shiu. “This settlement should put all federal contractors on notice that, in the Obama administration, we will be persistent when it comes to rooting out workplace discrimination and will vigilantly monitor employers who violate the law until they get it right.”
 
OFCCP previously cited JacintoPort for violating requirements of Executive Order 11246 by failing to implement an applicant tracking system for new hires, and to develop and execute action-oriented programs to recruit women and African-Americans. That matter was settled on June 6, 2006, with a conciliation document in which JacintoPort agreed to correct the violations and produce semiannual reports on the company’s progress in employing women and minorities.

In reviewing those progress reports, OFCCP investigators found that the company was giving preferential treatment to Latino applicants and systematically discriminating against African-Americans and Caucasians seeking longshoreman jobs. Under the terms of the latest conciliation agreement, JacintoPort will pay $219,000 in back wages and interest to the affected individuals, and make 17 job offers to members of the original class as longshoreman positions become available. In addition, JacintoPort has agreed to undertake extensive self-monitoring measures to ensure that all hiring practices fully comply with the law, including record-keeping requirements.

JacintoPort, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shawnee Mission, Kansas-based Seaboard Corp., currently holds more than $1.2 million in contracts to store and transport cargo for the Defense Commissary Agency.

A review of the EEOC’s press release from the 30-day period between December 13 and January 13 reveals the following:

Pepsi to Pay $3.13 Million and Made Major Policy Changes to Resolve EEOC Finding of Nationwide Hiring Discrimination Against African Americans 1/11/12

Family Dollar Stores of Virginia to Pay $45,000 to Settle EEOC Sexual Harassment Lawsuit 1/11/12

Matrix L.L.C. Will Pay $450,000 to Settle EEOC Race Discrimination and Retaliation Lawsuit 1/6/12

DynCorp to Pay $155,000 for Sex-Based Harassment and Retaliation In Iraq 1/6/12

Bank of Albuquerque Discriminated on the Basis of Age and Sex, EEOC Alleges in Lawsuit 1/4/12

Grand Central Partnership Fired Rastafarian for Complaining of Threatened Violence, EEOC Says 1/3/12

RCC Consultants, Inc. Sued for Disability Discrimination 12/29/11

EEOC Sues Midwest ISO for Disability Discrimination 12/23/11

Mesa Systems Sued by EEOC for National Origin Discrimination 12/23/11

American Apparel Agrees to Settle EEOC Disability Bias Suit for $60,000 12/19/11

Jim Robinson Ford-Lincoln-Mercury to Pay $56,000 to Settle EEOC Disability Lawsuit 12/16/11

EEOC Retaliation Case Against Cognis to Proceed, Federal Judge Orders 12/16/11

Wal-Mart to Pay $275,000 to Former Employee Fired after Cancer Surgery 12/16/11

EEOC Launches Small Business Task Force 12/15/11

EEOC Sues Wal-Mart for Disability Discrimination and Retaliation 12/15/11

B&B Pharmacy in Bellflower to Pay $70,000 for Disability Discrimination In EEOC Suit 12/15/11

M. Slavin & Sons to Pay $900,000 to Settle EEOC Discrimination Suit 12/15/11

Vitas Healthcare Sued By EEOC in Disability Discrimination Lawsuit 12/14/11

Dairy Queen Restaurant Sued By EEOC for Sexual Harassment and Retaliation 12/14/11

Federal Court Signs Order for Blockbuster Inc. To Pay Over $2m to Settle EEOC Suit for Sex, Race and National Origin Discrimination, Retaliation 12/14/11

UPS Unit to Pay $95,000 to Settle EEOC Disability Discrimination Suit 12/14/11

King Soopers to Pay $80,000 to Settle EEOC Disability Discrimination Lawsuit 12/13/11

Bottom line: The EEOC is cranking it up. Make sure you have your disability, discrimination, and sexual harassment training and tools up to date…or you could be the next press release!